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In 1991, reapportionment and redistricting were the most open, democratic, and racially
egalitarian in American history.  A series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions beginning with Shaw
v. Reno in 1993, however, insured that the 2001 redistricting would be completely different.
The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act and the Supreme Court=s interpretation
of them guaranteed minority groups unprecedented influence over redistricting in the 1990s. 
When Congress in 1981-82 considered requiring proof of only a racially discriminatory effect,
rather than a racially discriminatory intent, to void state or local election laws, critics warned
that this amendment would lead inexorably to racial gerrymandering and drives for proportional
representation for minority groups.  Congress adopted it anyway, and in an authoritative 1982
Senate report, it directed the Department of Justice not to allow states and localities in the Deep
South and scattered areas throughout the country to put into force laws that had racially
discriminatory effects.  The Justice Department therefore became an active ally of minority
voters during the 1990s redistricting.
In the most important voting rights decision of the 1980s, Thornburg v. Gingles (1986),
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan sustained the new effect standard.  Drawing on the
1982 Senate report and testimony from hearings on the Voting Rights Act, Brennan ruled that if
a minority group was sufficiently large and geographically compact to dominate an electoral
district, and if voting in the area was racially polarized, then states and localities had to draw
districts that would enable minority voters to elect candidates of their choice.   Because
compactness was notoriously difficult to define, because Brennan hadn=t tried to define it, and
2because Congress in 1989 had rejected a compactness standard for congressional districts,
redistricting planners in 1991 largely disregarded the compactness language in Gingles. 
To facilitate the 1991 redistricting, the U.S. Census Bureau rapidly made population and
ethnic data, already keyed to voting precincts, widely available in machine-readable form.  
Ethnic and interest groups, as well as factions of the political parties, individual politicians, and
members of the general public were given access to computers and software that made drawing
districts for local, state, and congressional seats quick and easy.  Many of them drafted
competing redistricting plans and took vigorous parts in hearings and debates.  Organizations
representing African-American and Latino voters, such as the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund,
and the American Civil Liberties Union, were especially active.
Both Republicans and Democrats initially supported drawing more minority opportunity
districts in 1991.  Republicans sought to pack largely Democratic African-Americans and
Latinos into as few districts as possible in order to maximize Republican seats.  Democrats, who
had to draw minority opportunity districts to satisfy their core constituents, aimed to minimize
their party=s losses of seats by extracting minorities from predominantly Republican districts,
which often produced jagged boundaries.  The result was the largest gain in minority
representation since the 1870s, modest losses in overall Democratic representation in Congress,
and, in reaction to both of these, a radical shift in Supreme Court doctrine by a five-person
conservative Republican majority on the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court had ruled in a series of cases in the 1970s and 80s that, in order to
have standing to sue under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, plaintiffs had to prove
injury.  In any event, an intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act, the Court decided, justified
3race-conscious redistricting. [United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey
(1977)]  Therefore, when five white North Carolinians challenged two 57 percent black
congressional districts that had elected the state=s first African-American members of Congress
in the 20th century on the grounds that planners had taken race into account in drawing the
districts, the majority of a three-judge federal panel dismissed the case.  In a bitterly contested 5-
4 decision in Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court, granting the five
white plaintiffs standing on the grounds that the sprawling districts conveyed a symbolic
message of racial difference to voters and public officials.  It did not matter that whites were not
discriminated against or whether the message that whites and blacks differed politically was true. 
The Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Sandra Day O=Connor said, prohibited any intentional
governmental distinctions between people on racial grounds.
After the Shaw decision, losing congressional candidates and advocates of what they
called Acolorblind@ policies, joined by southern state Republican parties, which now treated
redistricting as an affirmative action issue, challenged all but one black- or Latino-majority
congressional district in the South that had initially been drawn in the 1990s, and several
majority-minority districts outside the South, as well.  When a district court threw out two
majority-black Georgia districts that were much more compact than those in North Carolina, the
Shaw majority of the Supreme Court affirmed, condemning every district drawn for
Apredominantly racial@ reasons or in which race had been used Aas a proxy@ for Democratic
voting.  No longer was a Shaw-type claim restricted to majority-minority districts or those whose
shape annoyed some justices. [Miller v. Johnson (1995)]   Miller and two 1996 cases dismissed
compliance with the Voting Rights Act and attempts to overcome past discrimination or current
racial bloc voting as justifications for race-conscious districting.  Attempts to make it possible
4for Adiscrete and insular minorities@ to elect candidates of their choice, the majority ruled, were
much less important than adherence to what it termed Atraditional districting principles.@  These
newly discovered principles included not only compactness and protecting incumbents, but also,
for instance, the much-broken habit of drawing separate districts in Georgia=s four corners and,
according to one district judge, preserving the power of various white ethnic Acommunities of
interest.@  By contrast, Justice Anthony Kennedy dismissed  the notion that African-Americans
might form a community of interest  as Aoffensive and demeaning.@  And strikingly unlike its
treatment of pro-Democratic race-conscious districting plans, the Supreme Court sustained the
deliberate, openly-admitted packing of African-Americans into state legislative districts by Ohio
Republicans. [Voinovich v. Quilter (1993, 1996)]  Why Miller=s Apredominant reason@ or Arace as
a proxy@ tests did not apply to Republicans, the Court did not explain.
In a biting dissent in Bush v. Vera (1996), Justice John Paul Stevens accused the majority
of using race as an indirect means of attacking political gerrymanders.  After seeming to open
the door to challenges to partisan gerrymanders by ruling them justiciable in Davis v. Bandemer
(1986), the Court set the standard of proof so high as practically to foreclose such cases, and it
rejected without comment legal assaults on bipartisan gerrymanders and on the whole notion that
legislators should influence the shape of their districts. [Miller v. Ohio (1996); Bush v. Vera
(1996)] It also allowed the Bush Administration to block efforts to use statistical sampling to
insure that minority group members and other predominantly poor people were not missed by
the census, a decision that skewed the allocation of congressional seats toward the
predominantly white, Republican suburbs.
Thus, as always before in American history, party politics suffused the redistricting of the
1990s, and it promised to in the 2001 redistricting, as well, but this time it disguised itself behind
5the mask of race.  Racial dividing lines, long the most deep and consistent in the country=s
politics, increasingly split Republicans from Democrats.  Since any indication that race has been
considered in the drawing of district lines can be used in the inevitable legal challenges to every
major redistricting in 2001, there will be a strong incentive to conduct such discussions in secret
or in coded language.  Ironically, then, the Rehnquist Court has twisted the Fourteenth
Amendment into a barrier to the equal participation of minorities in allocating political power,
one which operates differentially against the political party to which they overwhelmingly
adhere, and it has so judicialized the redistricting process as to hamper popular participation and
open, frank deliberations concerning the key cleavage in American politics.  It is hardly an
outcome that the Warren Court could have foreseen when it strode self-confidently into the
political thicket in Baker v. Carr (1962).
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